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Abstract
New technologies have allowed rms to monitor low-skill workers more closely, thus
reducing the power of these workers. We show that this power-biased changemay
generate rising wage inequality and increases in the work intensity and unemployment
of low-skill workers.
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1 Introduction
Earnings inequality in the United States and other liberal market economies rose consid-
erably from the late 1970s through the early 1990s. Explanations for this change include
institutional change, increased openness to trade, and technological change. This paper
is about how to understand the contribution of technological change, and in particular of
new information and communications technologies (ICTs).
The contribution of new technology to earnings inequality has most often been ex-
plained in terms of skill-biased technological change (SBTC). An alternate hypothesis
focuses on agency problems within the rm and the e¤ects of ICTs on the ability of man-
agement to monitor the e¤ort of low-skill workers (Guy and Skott, 2005). An increase in
monitoring ability can be viewed as a reduction in the power of workers, and we refer to
this alternate explanation as power-biased technological change (PBTC).
Consider truck drivers. Prior to the 1980s a drivers employer usually had only a
vague idea of where the driver and truck were. Now the location of the truck, and even
the behavior of its engine, are often tracked by satellite. The skills required of the driver
have not changed, but his scope for taking advantage of possible slack in his schedule is
diminished, and the employer has new information with which to remove slack from the
schedule over time. Such pure cases are exceptional. Studies of the e¤ect of ICTs in grow-
ing industries such as retailing, banking and telecommunications show that a widening of
workplace power di¤erences following the adoption of ICTs is quite common. Signicant
populations of lower-paid workers face increased monitoring, more precise task specic-
ation, and reduced opportunity for promotion, while managers face more consequential
choices as a result of increased organizational exibility. To the extent these studies deal
with skill, however, skill di¤erentials appear to be widening, too (Grimshaw et al., 2002;
Hunter and Lafkas, 2003).
In this paper we focus on one end of this problem, the monitoring of low-paid workers.
Using an e¢ ciency-wage model, we show that PBTC can account for a simultaneous rise
in the relative wage and the relative employment of high-skill workers, generally regarded
as a key piece of evidence for the SBTC hypothesis. Unlike the SBTC hypothesis, it also
explains increased intensity of work e¤ort, evidence for which is reviewed by Green (2005).
2 The model
We consider an economy with two types of workers. There is no heterogeneity among
workers of a given type and employed workers always hold jobs that match their type.1.
All rms are identical and, disregarding non-labor inputs, output of the representative
rm is given by
Y = F (eHNH ; eLNL)
1Skott (2006) analyses earnings inequality when unemployed high-skill workers may accept low-skill
jobs.
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where ei and Ni denote e¤ort and employment of type i workers, i = H;L (H =high
power, L =low power). Our concern is with the e¤ect of asymmetric changes in the ability
of rms to monitor e¤ort, and in order to focus on this aspect we assume symmetry between
the two groups of workers in all other respects.
Workerschoice of e¤ort is determined by the cost of job loss and the sensitivity of
the risk of job loss to variations in e¤ort. We assume that if a rm pays the wage wi; the
e¤ort of its type-i workers is determined by the maximization of the objective function
V i,
V i = pi(ei)[wi   v(ei)  hi( wi; b; ui)] (1)
where wi;ui and b denote the average wage, the unemployment rate and the rate of un-
employment benets. As shown in the Appendix, an intertemporal optimization model
reduces to a special case of problem (1).
The functions v(ei) and pi(ei) describe the disutility associated with e¤ort and the
e¤ect of e¤ort on the expected remaining duration of the job, respectively. The symmetry
assumption implies that the v function is the same for both groups of workers, and
v0 > 0; pi0 > 0. The function hi( wi; b; ui) represents the expected utility in case of job loss;
the partial derivatives satisfy hiw > 0; h
i
b > 0 and h
i
u < 0 under all standard assumptions.
The rst order condition for the workers maximization problem can be written
 piv0 + (wi   v   hi)pi0 = 0 (2)
and we may write the solution to the problem as
ei = f
i(wi; wi; b; ui) (3)
The sign of the partial f iw must be positive at any wage (above the minimum) chosen by
a prot maximizing rm and, using the second order condition in combination with the
partials for hi; it is straightforward to show that f iw < 0; f
i
b < 0; f
i
u > 0.
Technical changes that improve rmsability to monitor e¤ort will shift the pi function.
The key property of this shift is that it a¤ects the sensitivity of the ring rate to variations
in e¤ort. Thus, we assume that
pi0
pi
= (ei; i) (4)
where the parameter i describes monitoring ability and  > 0. An improvement in
rmsability to monitor the e¤orts of individual workers makes the expected job duration
of any individual worker more sensitive to changes in the workers own e¤ort. Equation
(4) expresses this assumption.





and, using (3)-(5), the solutions for wage and e¤ort can be expressed2
wi = wi( wi; ui;i)
ei = ei( wi; ui;i)
In equilibrium, wi = wi and
wi = wi(ui;i); i = H;L (6)
ei = ei(ui;i); i = H;L (7)
Combining equations (6)-(7) with rmsrst order conditions with respect to employ-
ment, we get
wi = eiFi(eLNL; eHNH) (8)
Using the denitional relations between unemployment ui and employment Ni, equations
(6)-(8) yield equilibrium solutions for the endogenous variables (wi; ei; Ni) as functions of
the parameters i that describe the technology.
Denite conclusions concerning the e¤ects of a changes in power (changes in the para-
meters i) can be obtained if functional forms for the h ; p  and v functions are intro-
duced. We assume that the p  and v functions satisfy
pi0
pi






i ;  > 1 (10)
The specication of the semi-elasticity of the pi function in (9) can be seen as a log-linear
approximation of the pi function around the equilibrium solution for ei. Equation (10) is
standard, the parameter restriction  > 1 implying that given the chosen scale of e¤ort,
the disutility of e¤ort is strictly convex and that an equilibrium solution for w exists.











   1hi (12)
With respect to the fallback position hi, nally, we use the specic functional form obtained







( wi   v(ei)) (13)
where ei is determined by setting wi = wi in equation (3); r and  are the discount rate
and the rate of job separations, respectively.
2Unemployment benets are assumed constant and are therefore omitted from the expressions.
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Turning to the demand for labor, we assume a symmetric CES production function,
Y = A[0:5(eLNL)
  + 0:5(eHNH) ] 1=
where  = 1=(1 + ) is the elasticity of substitution. This specication implies that






With symmetric and inelastic labor supplies (normalized at unity), nally, we have
ui = 1 Ni (15)
The solutions for (eL; wL; NL; eH ; wH ; NH) can be derived using (11)-(15). Not surpris-
ingly, the fully symmetric case with L = H produces a symmetric solution for e¤ort,
wages and employment: (eL; wL; NL) = (eH ; wH ; NH):
The e¤ects of a decline in the power of L workers (a rise in L) depend critically on
the elasticity of substitution. It is readily seen that if the two types of workers are perfect
substitutes ( =  1); both the wage wL and employment NL must increase following
a rise in L. But perfect substitution is an extreme case. We know of no attempts to
estimate the elasticity of substitution between groups with di¤erent workplace power but
power and skill are strongly correlated (Guy and Skott, 2005), and the estimates of the
elasticity of substitution between di¤erent skill categories presented by Card, Kramarz
and Lemieux (1999) are all very low. Thus, the empirically interesting case is likely to be
one in which the elasticity of substitution is below unity, and the implications of changes
in L are explored in Table 1 for di¤erent, non-negative values of .
Table 1a assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function ( = 0) while Tables 1b-1c
introduce complementarity ( = 1 and  = 10). The variations in L are within (what we
consider) its plausible range. The intertemporal interpretation in the Appendix implies
that p = 1=(r + ) and hence that p0=p =   1r+ dde =   r+ 1e d log d log e where  is the rate of
job separations. Job separations happen for a range of reasons (including voluntary quits
and plant closures), and it seems unlikely that  d log d log e should exceed unity.3 It follows
that  will be less than one. With respect to the other parameters of the model, we use a
discount rate of r = 0:05 and a rate of separations of  = 0:2. Unemployment benets are
normalized at one, b = 1; the productivity parameter is A = 10, and the (inverse) indicator
of the power of H workers is H = 0:1: The parameter  in the utility function, nally,
must be greater then one (cf above), and the qualitative results appear to be insensitive
to the precise value. The tables use  = 5.
As indicated in Table 1, a decrease in the power of L workers benets the H workers
in terms of both wages and employment. Their e¤ort also goes up but the net welfare e¤ect
3This statement is meaningful, despite the ordinality of e¤ort, since the chosen scale implies that
productivity is proportional to e¤ort.
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can be calculated if one accepts the assumptions underlying the intertemporal optimization
in the Appendix. Given these assumptions, the welfare of unemployed and employed
workers can be measured by h(= rU) and x = (w   e) rr+ + h r+ (= rV ), and both hH
and xH increase for all values of .
L workers also benet from an erosion in their own power if the production function
is Cobb-Douglas. They increase e¤ort but employment and wages also improve, and the
net benets are unambiguously positive. The explanation is straightforward. Agency
problems lead to outcomes that are Pareto suboptimal, and the increased ability of rms
to monitor e¤ort reduces the agency problem. Taking into account the derived e¤ects on
employment and wages, workers may therefore in some cases benet from a decline in their
own workplace power. Tables 1b-1c, however, show how the improvements in employment
and wages are eroded as the degree of complementarity in production increases. With
weak complementarity ( = 1;  = 0:5) the wage as well as the utility variables hL and
xL move non-monotonically as the power indicator L changes. When  = 10; conditions
deteriorate along all three dimensions, and the welfare measures hL and xL decline strongly
when L increases.
The model can yield outcomes that are broadly in line with US and UK experience. If
 = 1; for instance, and there is an increase in L from 0.5 to 1, the low-paid L workers
raise e¤ort (=productivity) by about 10 percent, their real wage declines slightly, their
relative wage falls by about 12 percent, and the relative unemployment rates remain
roughly unchanged. One should not read too much into this broad congruence with
empirical observations, and we certainly do not claim that the model (and PBTC, more
generally) provides a complete explanation of the movements in wage inequality. The
simulations show, however, that the e¤ects of PBTC can be quantitatively important.
3 Conclusions
New technologies may change skill requirements but they also change the relative power of
di¤erent employees; the fact that more skilled employees have seen an increase in relative
pay does not demonstrate that it is the skill that is being compensated. Our model is
limited to changes in monitoring, which is just one avenue by which ICTs can a¤ect the
workplace power of employees. Within this territory it demonstrates that the PBTC
hypothesis can explain the simultaneous occurrence of lower wages, higher unemployment
and higher work e¤ort for the lower skilled.
4 Appendix
Consider an innitely lived agent with instantaneous utility function
u(c; e) = c  v(e)
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Assume that the interest rate r is equal to the discount rate. The time prole of consump-
tion is then a matter of indi¤erence to the agent, and we may assume that consumption
matches current income. If U denotes the value function of an unemployed worker, a





(w   v(e)) exp( rt) dt+ exp( rT ) U ]
where the stochastic variable T denotes the time that the worker loses the job. Assuming
a constant hazard rate, T is exponentially distributed. In a steady state, the objective




(w   v(e)) exp( rt) dt+ exp( rT ) U ] = (w   v(e)  h)p+ U
where h = rU and p = E(1  exp( rT ))=r = (1  r+ )=r = 1r+ is an increasing function
of the rate of separations .
The value function for an unemployed worker, and thus h; will depend on the average
level of wages, the rate of unemployment benets and the hiring rate. With a constant
rate of unemployment, the hiring rate q is proportional to the average rate of separations
q = 
L




where u is the unemployment rate and  is the average rate of separations. The risk of job
loss gives an incentive for workers to provide e¤ort. But an increased average ring rate
does not help the rm unless it raises e¤ort, and e¤ort is determined by the semi-elasticity
p0=p (see the rst order condition (2)). Thus, the average ring rate in the economy need
not be related to the average level of e¤ort, and we assume that  is constant.
In equilibrium, w = w and in order to nd the value of h = h( w; b; u) we note that
V   U = (w   h  v(e))p (A1)
U   V = (b  rV )s = fb  r[(w   h  v(e))p+ h
r
]gs (A2)
where s = E(1 exp( rTu)r ) and the stochastic variable Tu denotes the remaining length
of the spell of unemployment of a currently unemployed worker. With a constant rate of
separations, random hiring and constant unemployment, the stochastic variable Tu follows
an exponential distribution with expected value ETu = u1 uET where ET = 1= is the
average expected remaining duration of employment for an employed worker. Using (A1)-
(A2) and the expressions for p and s (p = 1=(r + ); s = 1=(r + (1   u)=u))), it follows
that
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Table 1: E¤ects of a decline in the power of L  workers
on e¤ort, wage and unemployment
1a: Cobb-Douglas,  = 0
L eL wL uL hL xL eH wH uH hH xH
0:1 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73
0:5 0:63 5:35 0:19 4:28 4:47 0:46 5:42 0:20 4:34 4:56
1:0 0:72 5:73 0:18 4:58 4:78 0:47 5:90 0:20 4:72 4:95
1b: Weak complementarity,  = 1
L eL wL uL hL xL eH wH uH hH xH
0:1 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73
0:5 0:61 4:65 0:20 3:72 3:89 0:47 6:00 0:20 4:80 5:03
1:0 0:69 4:63 0:19 3:70 3:86 0:48 6:73 0:19 5:38 5:65
1c: Strong complementarity,  = 10
L eL wL uL hL xL eH wH uH hH xH
0:1 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73
0:5 0:56 3:12 0:23 2:50 2:61 0:49 7:18 0:19 5:74 6:02
1:0 0:61 2:55 0:25 2:04 2:12 0:50 8:11 0:19 6:49 6:81
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